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Abstract
Admissibility has been studied for games of infinite duration with Boolean objectives. We extend
here this study to games of infinite duration with quantitative objectives. First, we show that, un-
der the assumption that optimal worst-case and cooperative strategies exist, admissible strategies
are guaranteed to exist. Second, we give a characterization of admissible strategies using the no-
tion of adversarial and cooperative values of a history, and we characterize the set of outcomes
that are compatible with admissible strategies. Finally, we show how these characterizations can
be used to design algorithms to decide relevant verification and synthesis problems.
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1 Introduction
Two-player zero-sum graph games are the most studied mathematical model to formalize
the reactive synthesis problem [15, 16]. Unfortunately, this mathematical model is often an
abstraction that is too coarse. Realistic systems are usually made up of several components,
all of them with their own objectives. These objectives are not necessarily antagonistic.
Hence, the setting of non-zero sum graph games is now investigated in order to unleash the
full potential of automatic synthesis algorithms for reactive systems, see e.g. [2,5,6,9,12,14].
For a player with objective ϕ, a strategy σ is said to be dominated by a strategy σ′ if σ′
does as well as σ with respect to ϕ against all the strategies of the other players and strictly
better for some of them. A strategy σ is admissible for a player if it is not dominated by any
other of his strategies. Clearly, playing a strategy which is not admissible is sub-optimal
and a rational player should only play admissible strategies. The elimination of dominated
strategies can be iterated if one assumes that each player knows the other players know that
only admissible strategies are played, and so on.
While admissibility is a classical notion for finite games in normal form, see e.g. [13] and
pointers therein, its generalization to infinite duration games is challenging and was only
considered more recently. In 2007, Berwanger was the first to show [2] that admissibility,
i.e. the avoidance of dominated strategies, is well-behaved in infinite duration n-player non-
zero sum turn-based games with perfect information and Boolean outcomes (two possible
payoffs: win or lose). This framework encompasses games with omega-regular objectives.
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The main contributions of Berwanger were to show that (i) in all n-player game structures,
for all objectives, players have admissible strategies, (Berwanger even shows the existence
of strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strategies) (ii) every strategy that is
dominated by a strategy is dominated by an admissible strategy, and (iii) for finite game
structures, the set of admissible strategies forms a regular set.
While the iterated admissibility formalizes a strong notion of rationality [1], it has been
shown recently that the non-iterated version is strong enough to synthesize relevant strategies
for non-zero sum games of infinite duration modelling reactive systems. In [11], Faella
considers games played on finite graphs and focuses on the states from which one designated
player cannot force a win. He compares several criteria for establishing what is the preferable
behavior of this player from those states, eventually settling on the notion of admissible
strategy. In [4], starting from the notion of admissible strategy, we have defined a novel
rule for the compositional synthesis of reactive systems, applicable to systems made of n
components which have each their own objective. We have shown that this synthesis rule
leads to solutions which are robust and resilient.
Here, we study the notion of admissible strategy in infinite horizon n-player turn-based
quantitative games played on a finite game structure. We give a comprehensive picture of the
properties related to the existence of such strategies and to their characterization. Contrary
to the Boolean case, the number of payoffs in our setting is potentially infinite making the
characterization challenging. As in [2], we assume all players have perfect information.
Main contributions. First, contrary to the Boolean case, we show that in the quantitative
setting, there are dominated strategies that are not dominated by any admissible strategy
(Example 9). Second, we show that the existence of worst-case optimal and cooperatively
optimal strategies for all players is a sufficient condition for the existence of admissible
strategies (Thm. 4). Additionally, we show that there are games without worst-case optimal
or without cooperative optimal strategies that do not have admissible strategies (Lem. 3).
Third, we provide a characterization of admissible strategies in terms of antagonistic and
cooperative values—that are classical values defined for quantitative games—(Thm. 11)
and a characterization of the outcomes compatible with admissible strategies (Thm. 13).
While the first characterization allows one to precisely describe admissible strategies, the
characterization of the set of outcomes is given in linear temporal logic, and is a useful
tool to reason about the outcomes that can be generated by such strategies. Finally, we
show how to use the aforementioned characterizations to obtain algorithms to solve relevant
decision problems for games with classical quantitative measures such as Inf, Sup, LimInf,
LimSup and mean-payoff (Thms. 17, 18, and 19).
Example. Let us consider the game from Fig. 1 to illustrate several notions and decision
problems introduced and solved in this paper. The game is played by two players: Player 1,
who owns the square vertices, and Player 2, owner of the round vertices. The measure that
we consider here is the mean-payoff. (But note that, the arguments we will develop in this
example are applicable to the limit inferior and limit superior measures as well.)
First, we note that the (best) worst-case value (or, the antagonistic value) that Player 1
can force is equal to 1, while the antagonistic value for Player 2 is equal to 0. The latter values
are meaningful under the hypothesis that the other player is playing fully antagonistically
and not pursuing their own objective. Now, if we account for the fact that Player 2 aims at
maximizing his own payoff and so plays only admissible strategies towards this goal, then
we conclude that he will never play the edge (v2, v1). This is because, from vertex v2, Player
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Figure 1 Player 1 controls the square vertices, and Player 2 the round vertices. The payoff of
Player i is the mean-payoff of the dimension i of the weights seen along the run.
2 has a strategy to enforce value 2 and taking edge (v2, v1) is unreasonable because, in the
worst case, from v1 he will only obtain 0. As we show in Sec. 6, this kind of reasoning can
be made formal and automated. We will show that, for games with classical quantitative
measures, it can indeed be decided algorithmically if a finite memory strategy given, for
instance, as a finite state Moore machine, is admissible or not.
Second, a similar but more subtle reasoning to the one presented above allows us to
conclude that Player 1 will eventually play the edge (v1, v2). Indeed, from vertex v1, Player
1 can force a payoff equal to 1 by either taking edge (v1, v3) or (v1, v2). Nevertheless, it is
not reasonable for him to play edge (v1, v3) because, while this choice enforces a worst-case
payoff equal to 1 (the antagonistic value), playing edge (v1, v2) is better because it ensures
the same worst-case payoff and additionally leaves a possibility for Player 2 to help him by
taking the cycle v2–v4, giving him a payoff of 2. If we take into account that the adversary is
playing admissible strategies, then, in the words of [4], we can solve the assume-admissible
synthesis problem. In this example, we conclude that Player 1 has a strategy to enforce a
payoff of 2 against all admissible strategies of Player 2. A strategy which eventually chooses
edge (v1, v2) ensures this payoff. The formalization of this reasoning and elements necessary
for its automation are presented in Sec. 6.
Structure of the paper. Sec. 2 contains definitions. In Sec. 3, we study conditions under
which the existence of admissible strategies is guaranteed. In Sec. 4, we give a characteriza-
tion of admissible strategies, and in Sec. 5, a description of the set of outcomes compatible
with admissible strategies. In Sec. 6, we apply our results to solve relevant decision problems
on games with classical quantitative measures.
2 Preliminaries
We denote by R the set of real numbers, Q the set of rational numbers, N the set of natural
numbers, and N>0 the set of positive integers.
A game is a tuple G = 〈P, (Vi)i∈P , vinit, E, (payoffi)i∈P 〉 where: (i) P is the non-empty
and finite set of players. (ii) V def=
⊎
i∈P Vi where for every i ∈ P , Vi is the finite set of
player i’s vertices, and vinit ∈ V is the initial vertex. (iii) E ⊆ V ×V is the set of edges (it is
assumed, w.l.o.g., that each vertex in V has at least one outgoing edge.) (iv) For every i in
P , payoffi is a payoff function from infinite paths in the digraph 〈V,E〉 to R that, intuitively,
player i will attempt to maximize.
An outcome ρ is an infinite path in the digraph 〈V,E〉, i.e. an infinite sequence of vertices
(ρj)j∈N>0 such that (ρj , ρj+1) ∈ E, for all j ∈ N>0. A finite prefix of an outcome is called a
history. The length |h| of a history h = (ρj)1≤j≤n is n. Given an outcome ρ = (ρj)j∈N>0 and
an integer k, we write ρ≤k for the history (ρj)1≤j≤k, that is, the prefix of length k of ρ. For
a history h and a history or outcome ρ, we write h ⊆pref ρ if h is a prefix of ρ. If h ⊆pref ρ,
we write h−1 · ρ for the unique history (resp. outcome) that satisfies ρ = h · (h−1 · ρ). The
first (resp. last) vertex of a history h is first(h) = h1 (resp. last(h)
def= h|h|). The longest
XX:4 Admissibility in Quantitative Graph Games
common prefix of two outcomes or histories ρ, ρ′ is denoted lcp(ρ, ρ′). Given vertex v from
G, let us denote the set of successors of v by Ev def= {v′ ∈ V | (v, v′) ∈ E}.
A strategy of player i is a function σi that maps any history h such that last(h) ∈ Vi to a
vertex from Elast(h). A strategy profile for the set of players P ′ ⊆ P is a tuple of strategies,
one for each player of P ′.
Let Σi(G) be the set of all strategies of player i in G. We write Σ(G) def=
∏
i∈P Σi(G)
for the set of all strategy profiles for P in G, and Σ−i(G) for the set of strategy profiles for
all players but i in G. We omit G when it is clear from the context. Given σi ∈ Σi and
σ−i = (σj)j∈P\{i} ∈ Σ−i, we write (σi, σ−i) for (σj)j∈P .
A strategy profile σP ∈ Σ defines a unique outcome from any given history h. Formally,
Outh(G, σP ) is the outcome ρ = (ρj)j∈N>0 such that ρ≤|h| = h and for j > |h|, if ρj ∈ Vi,
then ρj+1 = σi(ρ≤j). Notice that when h is a vertex, then this corresponds to starting the
game at that vertex. When G is clear from the context we shall omit it and write simply
Outh(σP ). If Si is a set of strategies for player i, we write Outh(Si) for {ρ | ∃σi ∈ Si, σ−i ∈
Σ−i : Outh(σi, σ−i) = ρ}. Here, Outh(Si) is the set of outcomes that are compatible with
Si. All notations for outcomes are lifted to histories in the obvious way. For a strategy
profile σP ∈ Σ, we write Histh(σP ) for the set {ρ≤j | ρ ∈ Outh(σP ), j ≥ |h|}.
Consider two strategies σ and τ for player i, and a history h. We denote by σ [h← τ ]
the strategy that follows strategy σ and shifts to τ at history h.
Formally, given a history h′ such that last(h′) ∈ Vi:
σ [h← τ ] (h′) def=
{
τ(h−1 · h′) if h ⊆pref h′
σ(h′) otherwise;
We now formally define dominance and admissibility. We recall the intuition: a player’s
strategy σ is dominated by another strategy σ′ of his if σ′ yields a payoff which is as good
as that of σ against all strategies for the other players, and is strictly better against some of
them. A strategy is admissible if no other strategy dominates it. More formally, we have:
Dominance. A strategy σi ∈ Σi very weakly dominates strategy σ′i ∈ Σi, written σi <
σ′i, if ∀σ−i ∈ Σ−i, payoffi
(
Outvinit(σ′i, σ−i)
) ≤ payoffi(Outvinit(σi, σ−i)). Strategy σi weakly
dominates strategy σ′i, written σ  σ′, if σ < σ′ and ¬(σ′ < σ). A strategy σ ∈ Σi is weakly
dominated if there exists σ′ ∈ Σi such that σ′  σ. A strategy that is not weakly dominated
is admissible. We denote by Ai(G) the set of all admissible strategies for player i in G.
Our characterizations and algorithms are based on the notions of cooperative and ant-
agonistic values of a history. The antagonistic value, denoted aVali(G, h), is the maximum
payoff that player i can secure from h in the worst case, i.e. against all strategies of other
players. The cooperative value, denoted cVali(G, h), is the best value player i can achieve
from h with the help of other players. We also define a third type of value: the antagonistic-
cooperative value, denoted acVali(G, h), which is the maximum value player i can achieve
in G with the help of other players while guaranteeing the antagonistic value of the current
history h. Formal definitions follow.
Antagonistic & Cooperative Values. The antagonistic value of a strategy and the cooper-
ative value of a strategy σi of player i in G, for a history h are
aVali(G, h, σi) def= inf
τ∈Σ−i
payoffi
(
Outh(σi, τ)
)
; cVali(G, h, σi) def= sup
τ∈Σ−i
payoffi
(
Outh(σi, τ)
)
.
The antagonistic value of a history h for player i, and the cooperative value of a his-
tory h for player i are defined as aVali(G, h) def= supσi∈Σi aVali(G, h, σi), and cVali(G, h)
def=
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Figure 2 Example game where local conditions
fail to capture admissibility.
s1 s21 20
Figure 3 Example game with an infinite
dominance chain and no admissible strategy
as witness of their being dominated.
supσi∈Σi cVali(G, h, σi), respectively. Finally, the antagonistic-cooperative value of a his-
tory h for player i is
acVali(G, h) def= sup{cVali(G, h, σi) | σi ∈ Σi,aVali(G, h, σi) ≥ aVali(G, h)}.
We omit G when it is clear from the context.
Observe that aVali(h) of a history is the value of a zero-sum two-player game where
player i is playing against players −i; while cVali(h) is the value in a one-player game,
when all players play together. acVali(h) is a new notion which is the supremum of the
values player i can obtain when he plays worst-case optimal strategies. A strategy σi ∈ Σi is
said to be worst-case optimal for player i at history h if aVali(h, σi) = aVali(h); it is said
to be cooperatively optimal for him at history h if cVali(h, σi) = cVali(h). Observe that
acVali(h) = −∞ if there are no worst-case optimal strategies from h.
I Example 1 (Local conditions are not sufficient). The game in Fig. 2 shows that admissibility
requires one to consider the values of the histories both in the past and in the future of the
current history. This shows that a local condition cannot capture admissibility. In fact,
consider strategy σ1 of player 1 (who controls all square vertices) that takes the edges
(s1, s2), (s4, s6). If the game starts at s2, σ1 is admissible, since the choice (s4, s5) could
yield a payoff of 2 which is worse than any payoff from s6. Indeed, we have that aVal1(s5) <
aVal1(s6). However, when the game starts at s1, σ1 is weakly dominated by the strategy that
chooses (s1, s3) since the worst payoff in the latter case is 5. In fact, when a strategy takes
the edge (s1, s2), the antagonistic value decreases from aVal1(s1) = 5 to aVal1(s2) = 3; so
to be admissible, it should have a better cooperative value than 5, which is not the case if
(s4, s6) is taken. The strategy taking (s1, s2), (s4, s5) is admissible. Indeed, in one outcome,
the payoff is 9, which is greater than 5 as required. Thus, an admissible strategy from s1
either goes to s3, or goes to s2 but commits to taking (s4, s5) later.
We use temporal logic to describe sets of outcomes. We consider an extension of standard
LTL with inequality conditions on payoffs for each player as in [3]. The logic, denoted
LTLpayoff, extends LTL, and its syntax is defined as follows.
ϕ ::= Q | ¬ϕ | Xϕ | Gϕ | Fϕ | ϕ1 U ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | payoffi ./ v,
where Q ∈ AP is a set of atomic propositions on edges, G and F are the standard LTL
modalities, ./∈ {≤,≥, <,>}, and v ∈ Q. A formula is interpreted over an outcome ρ at
index k as follows. We have, for instance, (ρ, k) |= Q if, and only if, (ρk, ρk+1) is labelled
with Q. For convenience, we write ρ |= ϕ instead of (ρ, 1) |= ϕ. Note that we define our
predicates on edges rather than vertices; this simplifies our presentation. The semantics
of the LTL modalities are standard; we refer to e.g. [3]. For payoff conditions, we have
(ρ, k) |= payoffi ./ v def⇐⇒ payoffi(ρ≥k) ./ v.
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Residual Games. Given game G, and history h, let us define Gh as the residual game
of G from h by modifying the initial state to last(h), and the payoff functions to payoffi′
defined as follows. For all outcomes ρ that start in last(h), payoffi′(ρ) = payoffi(haρ), where
haρ = h≤|h|−1 · ρ. Notice that the strategy sets of G and Gh are identical, and that for
any σP ∈ ΣP , we have Out(Gh, σP ) = Outlast(h)(G, σP ).
I Lemma 2. For all h′ ∈ Histlast(h)(G), it holds that aVali(Gh, h′) = aVali(G, hah′),
acVali(Gh, h′) = acVali(G, hah′), and cVali(Gh, h′) = cVali(G, hah′).
3 Existence of Admissible Strategies
We start this section with two examples of quantitative games with no admissible strategies
(for player 1). Then we identify a large and natural class of games for which the existence
of admissible strategies is guaranteed.
s1s3 a
Game A.
s1s3 s2
a
Game G.
Figure 4 Two games in which Player 1 has no admissible strategy.
Consider the games A and G in Fig. 4. Starting at s1, the payoff of player 1, in the
two games is defined as follows: an outcome that does not visit s3 has a payoff equal to 0,
otherwise, the payoff is equal to the number of times vertex a appears in the outcome. The
lemma below states that player 1 does not have admissible strategies in those two games.
We sketch the proof idea.
Consider first the one-player game A. The antagonistic value at vertex s1 is ∞. Any
strategy which never visits s3 is weakly dominated by strategies that visit a at least once
(i.e. with outcome (s1as1)+sω3 ). Furthermore, a strategy which does visit s3 and k times a
is weakly dominated by any strategy that visits a at least k + 1 times and then goes to s3.
The idea is similar for G where the cooperative value at s1 is ∞. Every strategy which
does not allow outcomes visiting s3 are weakly dominated by those that attempt to visit
a by visiting s2 at least once (as from s2, the other player can cooperate and visit a), and
then go to s3. Moreover, it is always possible to attempt to visit a once more before going
to s3, thus any strategy which eventually goes to s3 is also weakly dominated.
I Lemma 3. Player 1 does not have admissible strategies in games G and A.
In the two examples above, either the aVal or the cVal (which are both equal to ∞)
are not achievable. This is not a coincidence. We now show that all the games that admit
witnessing strategies for those values are guaranteed to have admissible strategies.
Games with strategies witnessing aVal and cVal. A game is well-formed whenever it
admits witnessing strategies for aVal and cVal, i.e. it satisfies:
1. For all i ∈ P , and h ∈ Histvinit(G), ∃σi ∈ Σi,aVali(h, σi) = aVali(h).
2. For all i ∈ P , and h ∈ Histvinit(G), ∃σi ∈ Σi, cVali(h, σi) = cVali(h).
These conditions will also be referred as Assumption 1 and 2.
We now establish the existence of admissible strategies for all well-formed games.
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I Theorem 4. In all well-formed games all players have admissible strategies.
The result follows from Lemmas. 6 and 7 below: the proof consists in showing that a
particular type of admissible strategies, called strongly cooperative-optimal, always exists.
Usually, those strategies are only a strict subset of the admissible strategies available to a
player. Nevertheless, they are peculiar as they are guaranteed to exist.
IDefinition 5. A strategy σi is strongly cooperative-optimal (SCO) if for all h ∈ Histvinit(σi),
if cVali(h) > aVali(h) then cVali(h, σi) = cVali(h), and if aVali(h) = cVali(h) then
aVali(h, σi) = aVali(h).
Strongly cooperative-optimal strategies are admissible because their cooperative values are
always maximal, and moreover, if a payoff better than the antagonistic value cannot be
achieved (aVali(h) = cVali(h)), then they are worst-case optimal. Any strategy which
obtains a better payoff than a SCO strategy against some adversary will obtain a worse
payoff against another one.
I Lemma 6. All strongly cooperative-optimal strategies are admissible.
Proof. Let σi be a strongly cooperative-optimal strategy for player i. Assume towards a
contradiction that some σ′i weakly dominates σi. Let h be any minimal history compatible
with σi such that σi(h) 6= σ′i(h).
If aVali(h) < cVali(h), then since last(h) is controlled by player i, aVali(hσ′i(h)) ≤
aVali(h) < cVali(h), and since σi is strongly cooperative optimal cVali(hσi(h), σi) =
cVali(h). Therefore, as the histories hσi(h) and hσ′i(h) are distinct, there is a strategy τ ∈
Σ−i such that payoffi(Outhσi(h)(σi, τ)) = cVali(h) > aVali(h) ≥ payoffi(Outhσ′i(h)(σ′i, τ)).
This contradicts that σ′i weakly dominates σi.
Otherwise aVali(h) = cVali(h), then since σi is strongly cooperative optimal, for all τ ∈
Σ−i, payoffi(Outh(σi, τ)) = cVali(h) and payoffi(Outh(σ′i, τ)) ≤ cVali(h). It follows that
no outcome of σ′i obtains a better payoff than σi. We thus obtain a contradiction. J
By Lem. 6, to prove the existence of admissible strategies, it suffices to prove the existence
of strongly cooperative-optimal strategies. We actually give a constructive proof.
I Lemma 7. In all well-formed games all players have SCO strategies.
Let us describe the idea of the construction. Consider any player i. We define the strategy σ
of player i as follows. For any history h, if aVali(h) = cVali(h), then σ plays a worst-case
optimal strategy from h, say σwcoh . Otherwise, we define σ starting from an outcome ρh
with payoffi = cVali(h), and we define σ is such a way that it follows ρh. In this case,
whenever another player deviates from ρh, say, at history h′, we reevaluate how to play
according to whether aVali(h′) < cVali(h′) or aVali(h′) = cVali(h′). Here, the existence
of σwcoh and that of ρh are guaranteed by the fact that the game is well-formed.
In subsequent sections, we consider SCO strategies in residual games Gh, so let us note
that these games satisfy the required assumptions if G does, which follows from Lem. 2.
I Lemma 8. For any well-formed game G, for all histories h ∈ Histvinit , the residual game
Gh is also well-formed.
We end this section with an interesting observation: an infinite weak dominance chain
is not necessarily dominated by an admissible strategy, as shown in the next example. The
reader should contrast the example with the fact that in the Boolean case all dominated
strategies are dominated by an admissible strategy [2, Thm. 11].
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I Example 9 (Non-dominated weak dominance chains). There are quantitative games that
have infinite dominance chains and no “maximal” admissible strategy weakly dominating
them. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 3. Denote by σk the strategy of player 1 (con-
trolling square vertices) which consists in moving from s1 to s2 exactly k times, and then
going left (unless payoff of 2 was reached in the meantime). Then for all k ∈ N, σk is weakly
dominated by σk+1 because if the adversary decides to move right from s2 at the (k+ 1)-th
step, σk+1 performs better than σk, and otherwise they yield identical outcomes. It follows
that all strategies σk for k ≥ 0, are dominated. Here, the only admissible strategy σ∞ con-
sists in looping in the cycle forever, which does not dominate any σk since if the adversary
always moves left from s2, then σ∞ yields less than σk.
I Remark. Above, we have defined strongly cooperative-optimal strategies that favour co-
operation whenever it can have an added value. We have established that those strategies
are always admissible. There are other classes of strategies that are always admissible, and
we define another interesting class here. A strategy σi is a worst-case cooperative optimal
strategy, if for all h ∈ Histvinit(σi): aVali(h, σi) = aVali(h), and cVali(h, σi) = acVali(h).
So those strategies ensure the worst-case value at all times and leave open the best cooper-
ation possible under that worst-case guarantee.
I Lemma 10. All worst-case cooperative optimal strategies strategies are admissible.
However, some well-formed games do not have worst-case cooperative optimal strategies.
4 Value-based Characterization of Admissible Strategies
We present our main result, which is, a value-based characterization of admissible strategies.
For any game G, and player i, let us define the following property, denoted ?(h, σ), for a
given strategy σ ∈ Σi(G) and history h:
cVali(h, σ) > aVali(h) (1)
∨ aVali(h, σ) = cVali(h, σ) = aVali(h) = acVali(h), (2)
Intuitively, we will show that a strategy is admissible if at all histories, either the strategy
promises a cooperative value greater than the antagonistic value at the current vertex, or a
higher cooperative value cannot be obtained without risking a lower antagonistic value (i.e.
aVali(h) = acVali(h)) and the strategy is worst-case optimal.
It turns out that requiring this property at all histories ending in a player’s vertices
characterize admissible strategies. We state our result in the following theorem.
I Theorem 11. Under Assumption 1, for any game G, player i, and σi ∈ Σi(G), σi is
admissible if, and only if, for all h ∈ Histvinit(G, σi) with last(h) ∈ Vi, ?(h, σi) holds.
It will be useful to consider the negation of ?(h, σ), which we simplify as follows:
I Lemma 12. For all histories h and strategy σ, the negation of ?(h, σ) is equivalent to
cVali(h, σ) ≤ aVali(h) ∧ aVali(h, σ) < aVali(h) (3)
∨ cVali(h, σ) = aVali(h, σ) = aVali(h) ∧ acVali(h) > aVali(h). (4)
Proof of Thm. 11. ⇒ We prove the contrapositive. Assume that ∃h ∈ Histvinit(G, σi),
last(h) ∈ Vi and ¬ ? (h, σi). Then by Lem. 12, either (3) or (4) holds for (h, σi).
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Assume (3) holds for (h, σi). By Assumption 1, there exists a worst-case optimal strategy
σwcoh from h, with aVali(h, σwcoh ) = aVali(h). Define σ′i
def= σi[h ← σwcoh ]. We claim that σ′i
weakly dominates σi. In fact, for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i(G) with h 6∈ Histvinit(G, σ−i), we have
Outvinit(G, σi, σ−i) = Outvinit(G, σ′i, σ−i). For any σ−i ∈ Σ−i(G) compatible with h, both out-
comes go through h. By definition of σ′i, Outvinit(G, σ′i, σ−i) = h≤|h|−1 ·Outh(G, σwcoh , σ−i).
Therefore, we have that payoffi(Outvinit(G, σ′i, σ−i)) ≥ aVali(h) by definition of σwcoh . The
latter is greater than cVali(h, σi) from (3), so greater than payoffi(Outvinit(G, σi, σ−i))
by definition of cVali(·). Thus, σ′i very weakly dominates σi. Since by assumption,
aVali(h, σi) < aVali(h), and h is compatible with σi, there is a strategy σ−i ∈ Σ−i such
that h ⊆pref Outvinit(G, σi, σ−i) and payoffi(Outvinit(G, σi, σ−i)) < aVali(h). As shown be-
fore, aVali(h) ≤ payoffi(Outvinit(G, σ′i, σ−i)). Hence, σ′i weakly dominates σi.
Assume now that (4) holds. Consider ε > 0 small enough so that acVali(h) > aVali(h)+
ε. By definition of acVali(h), there exists a strategy τi ∈ Σi such that cVali(h, τi) ≥
aVali(h) +ε, and moreover aVali(h, τi) ≥ aVali(h). Consider τ−i ∈ Σ−i compatible with h
such that payoffi(Outh(G, h, (τi, τ−i))) ≥ cVali(h, τi) − ε2 ≥ aVali(h) + ε2 > aVali(h).
Note that such a τ−i exists by definition of cVali(h, τi). It follows that σi[h ← τi] weakly
dominates σi. In fact, the outcomes are identical for any outcome not compatible with h.
For any σ−i compatible with h, we have payoffi(Outvinit(G, σi, σ−i)) = aVali(h) by (4).
Moreover, payoffi(Outvinit(G, σ′i, σ−i)) ≥ aVali(h) since at h we have that aVali(h, τi) ≥
aVali(h); thus aVali(h, σ′i) ≥ aVali(h). Furthermore, we have payoffi(Outvinit(G, σ′i, τ−i)) >
aVali(h) ≥ payoffi(Outvinit(G, σi, τ−i)).
⇐ Assume that for all h ∈ Histvinit(G, σi) with last(h) ∈ Vi, we have ?(h, σi), and that
σi is weakly dominated by some strategy σ′i. We will show a contradiction.
Let σ−i be a strategy in Σ−i(G) and ρ = Outvinit(G, σi, σ−i) and ρ′ = Outvinit(G, σ′i, σ−i).
If ρ = ρ′ then payoffi(ρ′) ≤ payoffi(ρ) and otherwise let j be the first index where they differ,
and h = ρ≤j−1 = ρ′≤j−1. We have that h is compatible with both strategies, last(h) ∈ Vi
and σi(h) 6= σ′i(h).
If (1) holds, that is, cVali(h, σi) > aVali(h), consider ε > 0 such that cVali(h, σi) >
aVali(h) + ε, and a strategy σ′−i ∈ Σ−i which ensures that payoffi(Outhσi(h)(G, σi, σ′−i)) ≥
cVali(h, σi) − ε2 , and payoffi(Outhσ′i(h)(G, σ′i, σ′−i)) ≤ aVali(h, σ′i) + ε2 . Such a strategy
profile σ′−i exists since hσ′i(h) and hσi(h) are distinct, and since last(h) ∈ Vi. The latter
also implies that aVali(h) ≥ aVali(h, σ′i). It thus follows that
payoffi(Outvinit(G, σi, σ−i[h← σ′−i])) > payoffi(Outvinit(G, σ′i, σ−i[h← σ′−i]))
contradicting the fact that σ′i weakly dominates σi.
Therefore (2) must hold, and acVali(h) = aVali(h). If there exists j ≥ |h| such that
aVali(ρ′≤j) < aVali(h), then there exists ε > 0 and a strategy profile σ′−i ∈ Σ−i compatible
with h which ensures that payoffi(Outvinit(G, σ′i, σ′−i)) ≤ aVali(ρ′≤j) + ε < aVali(h) ≤
payoffi(Outvinit(G, σi, σ′−i)). This contradicts σ′ weakly dominating σ. Hence for all j ≥
|h|, aVali(ρ′≤j) ≥ aVali(h). Now, observe that payoffi(ρ′) ≤ acVali(h). In fact, one
can construct a strategy τ , which, from h follows ρ′, and in case another player does not
respect ρ, switches to a worst-case optimal strategy ensuring aVali(ρ′≤j) ≥ aVali(h). It
follows that payoffi(ρ′) ≤ cVali(h, τ) ≤ acVali(h). Furthermore, by (2), payoffi(ρ) ≥
acVali(h) = aVali(h, σi), so payoffi(ρ′) ≤ payoffi(ρ). This being true for all strategies of Σ−i
proves that σi very weakly dominates σ′i and contradicts that σ′i weakly dominates σi. J
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5 Characterization of the Outcomes of Admissible Strategies
Observe that the characterization of Thm. 11 does not immediately yield an effective repres-
entation of the set of admissible strategies. In order to reason about the possible behaviors
observable in a game under admissible strategies we are interested in describing the set of
outcomes that can be observed when all players play admissible strategies. In this section,
for each player, we give a linear temporal logic description of the outcomes that are each
compatible with at least one admissible strategy.
Note that our main goal is to obtain such a characterization in full generality, for all
well-formed games so we defer computability considerations to the next section. We will
then see how the three types of values can be computed at all histories.
Let us fix a game G, and player i. We present the intuition of the characterization. If
an outcome ρ is compatible with an admissible strategy, say σi, then all prefixes h with
last(h) ∈ Vi must satisfy (1) or (2). Given h, if (1) holds, then two things can happen.
Either payoffi(ρ) > aVali(h), and thus ρ witnesses cVali(h, σi) > aVali(h), or this is not the
case but there is another outcome ρ′—compatible with σi—extending h with payoffi(ρ′) >
aVali(h). Notice how the longest common prefix of ρ and ρ′ ends always with a vertex
in V−i since both outcomes are compatible with σi. If (2) holds at h, then, in particular,
payoffi(ρ) = aVali(h) and, moreover, aVali remains constant at all prefixes of ρ extending h.
The last observation simply follows from aVali(h, σi) = aVali(h) which is implied by (2).
Extended LTLpayoff. Let aValuesi = {aVali(h) | h is a history} be the set of antagonistic
values of player i. We will now define atomic propositions attached to edges of a game.
Formally, we have a labelling function λ : E → P(AP) which assigns to every edge a set of
propositions from AP. The set AP includes the proposition Vi whose truth value, for every
edge e = (u, v), is determined as follows: Vi ∈ λ(u, v) def⇐⇒ u ∈ Vi.
We consider LTLpayoff with atomic propositions as defined above and additional propos-
itions aValiq, acValiq, and gAltiq defined for all q ∈ aValuesi. The semantics of these are
straightforward: for an outcome ρ and k ∈ N>0 we have
(ρ, k) |= aValiq def⇐⇒ aVali(ρ≤k) = q,
(ρ, k) |= acValiq def⇐⇒ acVali(ρ≤k) = q, and
(ρ, k) |= gAltiq def⇐⇒ ρk ∈ V−i ∧ ∃v′ 6= ρk : (ρk, v′) ∈ E ∧ cVali(ρ≤k · v′) > q,
with the convention that, when k is omitted, we assume it is 1.
As mentioned earlier, we consider two cases depending on whether (1) or (2) hold. Thus,
let us define the corresponding two sub-formulas:
ϕ1
def=
∨
q∈aValuesi
(
aValiq ∧
(
payoffi > q ∨ F(gAltiq)
))
, and
ϕ2
def=
∨
q∈aValuesi
(
aValiq ∧ acValiq ∧ payoffi = q ∧ G
(
aValiq
))
.
We define the following formula which will be shown to capture the outcomes of admissible
strategies: Φiadm
def= G (¬Vi ∨ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) .
I Theorem 13. For any well-formed game G, outcome ρ satisfies Φiadm if, and only if, it is
compatible with an admissible strategy for player i.
We give the idea of the proof. For any outcome ρ compatible with an admissible strategy
σi for player i. We show that for any prefix h of ρ with last(h) ∈ Vi, (ρ, |h|) satisfies either
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ϕ1 or ϕ2. In fact, by Thm. 11, either (1) or (2) hold, and we show that these correspond to
ϕ1 and ϕ2.
Conversely, for any ρ satisfying Φiadm, we construct an admissible strategy σi for player i
compatible with ρ. The strategy follows ρ, and in case of deviation, it switches immediately
either to an SCO—which is guaranteed to exist—or to a worst-case optimal strategy, de-
pending on whether ϕ1 or ϕ2 holds at the current history. The resulting strategy is proven
to be admissible.
Assuming prefix-independence. Before concluding this section, let us consider the con-
sequences of further assuming that our payoff function is prefix-independent.
3. For all i ∈ P , for all outcomes ρ, it holds that ∀j ∈ N, payoffi((ρk)k≥j) = payoffi(ρ).
Observe that, under Assumption 3, the set aValuesi can be equivalently defined as
{aVali(v) | v ∈ V } and is thus finite. One can also extend the labelling λ and set of atomic
propositions AP such that, for every edge e = (u, v) and q ∈ aValuesi:
aValiq ∈ λ(u, v) def⇐⇒ aVali(u) = q,
acValiq ∈ λ(u, v) def⇐⇒ acVali(u) = q, and
gAltiq ∈ λ(u, v) def⇐⇒ u ∈ V−i ∧ ∃v′ 6= v : (u, v′) ∈ E ∧ cVali(v′) > q.
It immediately follows that:
I Lemma 14. Under Assumption 3, for all i ∈ P , Φiadm is expressible in LTLpayoff.
6 Applications and Future Works
In this section, we show how to apply Theorem 11 (value-based characterization of admissible
strategies) and Theorem 13 (characterization of the set of outcomes of admissible strategies)
to solve relevant verification and synthesis problems.
Classical payoff functions. So far, we have assumed that games were equipped for each
player i ∈ P with a payoff function. To define payoff functions, we proceed as usual by first
assigning weights to edges of the game graph using weight functions wi : E → Q, one for each
player i ∈ P . With the weight function wi, we associate to each outcome ρ = ρ1ρ2 . . . ρn . . . ,
an infinite sequence of rational values wi(ρ) = wi(ρ1ρ2)wi(ρ2ρ3) . . . wi(ρnρn+1) . . . , and we
aggregate this sequence of values with measures such as Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, and mean
payoff (MP and MP). It is well known, see e.g. [7] and [18], that all the payoff functions
defined above satisfy Assumptions 1-2. By Theorem 4, we get the following.
I Lemma 15. In games with payoff functions from Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, and MP,
all players have admissible strategies.
It is also known that, in games defined with the payoff functions considered here, the
antagonistic and cooperative values (cVal and aVal) are computable. One can also show
that acVal is computable for prefix-independent payoff functions. Indeed, this value of a
vertex coincides with the cVal inside the sub-graph induced by the vertices with the optimal
antagonistic value. Furthermore, using a classical transformation on the game structure, we
can guarantee that all payoff functions above are prefix-independent. We thus obtain the
following result, by Lemma 14.
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I Lemma 16. In games with payoff functions from Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, and MP,
the formulas Φiadm for all i ∈ P are effectively computable, finite, and expressible in LTLpayoff.
We will now consider several problems of interest which can be solved using the charac-
terizations that we have developed in the previous sections. All the results are applicable to
the measures concerned by Lemmas 15 and 16.
Deciding the admissibility of a finite memory strategy. As a first example, we
consider the problem of deciding, given a game structure G, and a (finite memory) strategy
σi for player i ∈ P described as a finite state transducer Mi, if σi is admissible in G.
To solve this problem, we rely on Theorem 11 and proceed as follows. First, we compute
for each vertex v of the game G, the values aVali(G, v), cVali(G, v), and acVali(G, v).
Second, we construct the synchronized product between the transducer Mi that defines the
strategy σi and the game G. States in this product are of the form (v,m) where v is a
vertex of G and m is a (memory) state of the transducer Mi. Third, we compute for each
state (v,m) the values aVali(G, (v,m), σi), cVali(G, (v,m), σi), and acVali(G, (v,m), σi).
Finally, we verify that there is no reachable vertex (v,m) in the product where condition
(1) or condition (2) are falsified. We then obtain the following theorem:
I Theorem 17. Given a game G and a finite memory strategy σi for player i ∈ P specified
as a finite state transducer Mi, we can decide if σi is an admissible strategy for player i in
PTime for measures Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup; in NP ∩ coNP for MP, and MP.
Model-checking under admissibility. We now turn to the following problem. Given a
game structure G and a LTLpayoff formula ϕ, decide if all outcomes of the game that are com-
patible with the admissible strategies of all players satisfy ϕ, i.e. if
⋂
i∈P Out(G,Ai(G)) |= ϕ.
This problem was introduced in the Boolean setting in [5] and allows one to check that a
property is induced by the rationality of the players in a game.
I Theorem 18. For all measures Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, MP, MP, one can decide, given
game G and LTLpayoff formula ϕ, whether
⋂
i∈P Out(G,Ai(G)) |= ϕ.
Proof Sketch. For each player i ∈ P , consider the formula Φiadm from Theorem 13, which
describes the set Out(G,Ai(G)). The formula is finite and constructible by Lemma 16. The
problem now amounts to verifying if G satisfies the specification (∧i∈P Φiadm) =⇒ ϕ. For
all payoff functions, except mean-payoff, this can be reduced to model checking an LTL
formula (since the measures are regular). For MP and MP, the result follows from [3] which
shows that the model checking problem against LTLpayoff is decidable. J
Quantitative assume-admissible synthesis. In [4], a new rule for reactive synthesis
in non-zero sum n-player games was proposed. The setting there is similar to the setting
considered here but it is Boolean: each player i ∈ P has his own omega-regular objective
Oi ⊆ V ω. The synthesis rule asks if player i ∈ P has a strategy to enforce its own objective
Oi against admissible strategies of the other players. In other words, the rule asks for the
existence of worst-case optimal strategies against rational adversaries.
The quantitative extension of this problem asks given a game G, a player i ∈ P , and a
LTLpayoff formula ϕ, ∃σ ∈ Ai,∀τ ∈ A−i, ϕ. Using Theorem 13, we can reduce this query to a
plain two-player zero-sum game on the game structure G with objective:
∃σ ∈ Σi,∀τ ∈ Σ−i,Φiadm ∧
((∧
j∈P\{i}Φ
j
adm
)
=⇒ ϕ
)
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Since for Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup, Φiadm and ϕ are omega-regular, the problem reduces
to deciding the winner in a two-player zero-sum game with omega-regular objectives. As a
consequence, we obtain the following theorem:
I Theorem 19. The quantitative assume-admissible synthesis problem for player i ∈ P is
decidable for measures Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup.
For the measures MP, MP, we obtain objectives in which mean-payoff constraints and
omega-regular constraints are mixed. On the one hand, those objectives are outside known
decidable classes of objectives treated in [8] and in [10]. On the other hand, the undecidability
results obtained in [17] do not apply to them. This motivates further research on zero-sum
two player games with a mix of mean-payoff and omega-regular objectives.
Towards iterative elimination. Once we have computed the admissible strategies for
each player, we restrict each player to these strategies, and repeat the computation of the
admissible strategies in the restricted game. This can be iterated several times and gives a
process that is called iterative elimination of dominated strategies, and well known in game
theory. This process is difficult to analyze for mean-payoff, because objectives of different
players interfere in non-trivial ways and games with Boolean combinations of mean-payoff
objectives are undecidable [17]. However it seems feasible for regular payoffs, such as Inf,
Sup, LimInf and LimSup, for which we can construct parity automata recognizing outcomes
with payoffi > q. Given i ≥ 0, we can actually compute a parity automaton accepting the
set of outcomes of Si which is the set of strategies that remain after i steps of elimination.
We summarize here the ingredients but leave the details for future work. Assume we have a
parity automaton representing the outcomes of Si. Note that for i = 0 this is simply all out-
comes. If the payoffs are regular, then we can compute values cVali(h,Si), aVali(h,Si) and
acVali(h,Si), which correspond to cooperative, antagonistic, and antagonist-cooperative
values when players only play strategies from Si. We can then use these values as atomic
propositions for a LTLpayoff formulas similar to Φiadm of Section 5, which characterizes out-
comes of strategies of Si+1. In the case of regular payoffs this yields a parity automaton
which represents the outcomes of Si+1. This procedure can then be repeated to compute
outcomes that are possible under iterative elimination.
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7 Formal definition of the considered payoff functions
We recall the definition of the measures below:
the Inf (Sup) payoff, is the minimum (maximum) weight seen along an outcome: Inf(pi) =
inf{w(vi, vi+1) | i ≥ 1} and Sup(pi) = sup{w(vi, vi+1) | i ≥ 1};
the LimInf (LimSup) payoff, is the minimum (maximum) weight seen infinitely often:
LimInf(pi) = lim infi→∞ w(vi, vi+1) and LimSup(pi) = lim supi→∞ w(vi, vi+1);
the mean-payoff value, i.e. the limiting average weight, defined using lim inf or lim sup
since the running averages might not converge: MP(pi) = lim infk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
i=1 w(vi, vi+1)
and MP(pi) = lim supk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
i=1 w(vi, vi+1).
8 Proof of Lem. 2
Proof. We have
aVali(Gh, h′) = infτ supσ payoffi′(Outh′(Gh, σ, τ))
= infτ supσ payoffi(haOuth′(Gh, σ, τ)).
Now for each fixed τ ,
supσ payoffi(haOuth′(Gh, σ, τ)) = supσ payoffi(Out
hah′(G, σ, τ)),
since for any σ on the left-hand side, one can define a strategy σ′ by: σ′(g) = σ(g≥|h|)
if hah′ ⊆pref g, and defined arbitrarily otherwise. This proves that the LHS is less than
or equal to the RHS. Conversely, for any σ on the right hand side, we can define σ′ by
σ′(g) = σ(hag) if h′ ⊆pref g and arbitrarily otherwise. It follows that aVali(Gh, h′) =
aVali(G, hah′).
The cases for acVali and cVali are shown similarly. J
9 Proof of Lem. 3
Proof. As we noted above, the antagonistic (thus the cooperative) value at vertex s1 is ∞.
Given any strategy σ, if s3 is never visited, then σ is clearly weakly dominated by a strategy
that follows the outcome (s1s2a)sω3 . Otherwise, assume σ generates the outcome h · sω3
where h does not contain s3. Then, σ is weakly dominated by a strategy that generates
h(s2as1)sω3 whose payoff is greater than that of σ. Thus, all strategies are weakly dominated.
Let us now show that player 1 has no admissible strategy in G. Consider any strategy σ.
Assume that s3 is never visited by σ on compatible histories. In this case, the strategy that
goes to s2 once, and then goes to s3 dominates σ. In fact, its payoff is 0 in the worst-case,
and for some adversary strategy, it yields a payoff of 1. Assume otherwise that at some
history h with last(h) = s1, σ goes to s3. We have that
aVali(h) = |h|a = aVali(h, σ) = cVali(h, σ) < cVali(h) =∞,
where |h|a is the number of a’s in h. Let us define σ′ identically to σ, except that at h, it
goes to s2, and at the next visit to s1, it goes to s3. Then σ′ dominates σ. In fact, for all
strategies τ ∈ Σ−i, with h 6⊆pref Out(σ, τ), we have Out(σ′, τ) = Out(σ, τ). For all τ ∈ Σ−i
for which h is a prefix of Out(σ, τ), the payoff is aVali(h). On the other hand, Out(σ′, τ)
has payoff at least aVali(h), and for some particular τ0 ∈ Σ−i, the payoff of Out(σ′, τ0) is
aVali(h) + 1. It follows that σ is weakly dominated. J
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10 Proof of Lem. 7
Proof. We construct a strongly cooperative-optimal strategy for player i, as follows. For
each history h with aVali(h) < cVali(h), let us fix an outcome ρh with h ⊆pref ρh such
that payoffi(ρh) > aVali(h). Such an outcome exists by Assumption 2; let us denote
by (σscoh , σscoh,−i) any strategy profile compatible with ρh. Furthermore, for each h with
aVali(h) = cVali(h), we fix a strategy σwcoh such that aVali(h, σwcoh ) = aVali(h), which
exists by Assumption 1. Informally, we define our strategy σ as follows. If aVali(h) =
cVali(h), then we switch to σwcoh . Otherwise, we start following ρh, and whenever a
player deviates from ρh, say, at history h′ with h ⊆pref h′, we start again according to
whether aVali(h′) < cVali(h′).
Let us now formalize the strategy described in the core of the paper. In particular, we
need to describe the set of histories at which the strategy switches to ρh or to σwcoh . We define
decision points D as a set of histories, where such a decision will be made, incrementally. We
define Di, for each i, such that D0 ∪ . . .∪Di contains at least all decision points of length at
most i, and possibly some additional longer decision points. We will then let D = ∪i≥0Di.
Here, notice that for all j ≥ i, {h ∈ Histvinit , |h| ≤ i} ∩ Dj is constant. So the union can be
seen as a limit.
Initially, for i = 0, vinit ∈ D0. Consider now i > 0, and assume D0, . . . ,Di have been
defined. For all h ∈ D0 ∪ . . . ∪ Di with |h| = i, if aVali(h) = cVali(h), then Di+1 contains
no history extending h. If aVali(h) < cVali(h), then we add to Di+1 all histories of the
following set:
{h′ | h ⊆pref h′ ∧ h′|h′|−1 ∈ V−i ∧ h′≤|h′|−1 ⊆pref ρh ∧ h′ 6⊆pref ρh}
∪
{h′ | h ⊆pref h′ ⊆pref ρh ∧ aVali(h′) = cVali(h′))}.
In other terms, all histories extending h, and deviating from ρh by one step due to some
player in −i, and those prefixes of ρh where the antagonistic value equals the cooperative
value.
For any h, let us define d(h) as the longest prefix of h that belongs to D. This is well
defined since vinit ∈ D. We now define our strategy σ as
σ(h) =
{
σwcod(h)(h) if aVali(d(h)) = cVali(d(h)),
σscod(h)(h) if aVali(d(h)) < cVali(d(h)).
We now show that
I Claim 20. σ is SCO.
The desired result follows.
For any history h with aVali(h) = cVali(h), we have that aVali(d(h)) = cVali(d(h)).
In fact, if d(h) = h then this trivially holds. Otherwise, we have d(h) ⊆pref h. In this case,
if aVali(d(h)) < cVali(d(h)), then h ⊆pref ρd(h), and by definition of D, h ∈ D, which
is a contradiction. Now, aVali(d(h), σwcod(h)) = aVali(d(h)) = cVali(d(h)) by construction.
Since h is compatible with σwcod(h), aVali(h, σwcod(h)) ≥ aVali(d(h)), and since cVali(·) cannot
increase along a history, we have cVali(h) ≤ cVali(d(h)). We get that
aVali(d(h)) ≤ aVali(h, σwcod(h)) ≤ aVali(h) ≤ cVali(h) ≤ cVali(d(h)).
Since aVali(d(h)) = cVali(d(h)), we have that aVali(h, σwcod(h)) ≤ aVali(h). By definition
of D we have that no extension of d(h) is contained in D and that therefore d(h′) = d(h)
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for all histories h′ extending h. Thus σ(h′) = σwcod(h)(h′) for all histories h′ extending h and
aVali(h, σ) = aVali(h).
Consider now history h with aVali(h) < cVali(h). If d(h) = h, then
cVali(h, σ) = cVali(h) > aVali(h)
by construction of σ; and we have (1). Assume otherwise. We cannot have aVali(d(h)) =
cVali(d(h)), since the above sequence of inequalities again would prove that aVali(h) =
cVali(h) which is not true. Thus, we must have aVali(d(h)) < cVali(d(h)). This means
that h is compatible with σscod(h). Thus, we have
payoffi(Outh(σscod(h), σscod(h),−i)) = cVali(d(h)) > aVali(d(h)).
Now, since h is a prefix of ρd(h), we have
cVali(h) ≥ payoffi(ρd(h)) = cVali(d(h)).
It follows that cVali(h, σ) = cVali(d(h)) = cVali(h) since cVali is non-increasing along
histories. J
11 Proof of Lem. 12
Proof. The negation of (3) ∨ (4) yields
cVali(h, σ) > aVali(h) ∨ aVali(h, σ) ≥ aVali(h)
and cVali(h, σ) = aVali(h, σ) = aVali(h) =⇒ acVali(h) ≤ aVali(h).
We can rewrite the first line as follows
cVali(h, σ) > aVali(h) ∨ (cVali(h, σ) ≤ aVali(h) ∧ aVali(h, σ) ≥ aVali(h))
The second term implies cVali(h, σ) ≤ aVali(h) ≤ aVali(h, σ), and is thus equivalent
to aVali(h, σ) = cVali(h, σ) = aVali(h). Using this, and distributing the conjunction over
the disjunction, we get
cVali(h, σ) > aVali(h)
∨(cVali(h, σ) = aVali(h, σ) = aVali(h)∧
cVali(h, σ) = aVali(h, σ) = aVali(h) =⇒ acVali(h) ≤ aVali(h).
)
Simplifying the second term yields the equivalence with (1) ∨ (2). J
12 Proof of Thm. 13
. We first need the following lemma, which formalizes the following intuition: for any
outcome compatible with a given strategy, if acVal coincides with the aVal at some position,
and aVal does not decrease from that point on, then acVal and aVal are constant in the
rest of the outcome. A proof of the claim is given in appendix.
I Lemma 21. Let G be a game, h ∈ Histvinit be a history, σi a strategy of player i, and ρ
an outcome extending h compatible with σi, i.e. ρ ∈ Outh(σi). Assume there exists j ≥ |h|
such that acVali(ρ≤j) = aVali(ρ≤j). The following hold
label=(a) for all k > j, if for all j ≤ j′ < k we have that ρj′ ∈ Vi =⇒ aVali(ρ≤j′+1) ≥
aVali(ρ≤j′) then acVal(ρ≤k) = aVal(ρ≤k) = acVal(ρ≤j) = aVal(ρ≤j);
lbbel=(b) if aVali(ρ≤j , σi) = aVali(ρ≤j) then payoffi(ρ) = aVali(ρ≤j) and for all k ≥ j we
have acVal(ρ≤k) = aVal(ρ≤k) = acVal(ρ≤j) = aVal(ρ≤j).
Proof.
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(a) Consider an arbitrary k > j. We first note that the players −i cannot decrease
aVal; more precisely, it follows form the definition of aVal that for any j′ with ρj′ 6∈ Vi,
aVali(ρ≤j′+1) ≥ aVali(ρ≤j′). Thus, if for all j ≤ j′ < k, ρj′ ∈ Vi =⇒ aVali(ρ≤j′+1) ≥
aVali(ρ≤j′), then we can write
∀j ≤ j < k,aVali(ρ≤j′+1) ≥ aVali(ρ≤j′). (5)
We will now argue that acVali(ρ≤j′) ≤ acVali(ρ≤j) for all j ≤ j′ < k. Suppose, towards
a contradiction, that there is some j ≤ j′ < k such that acVali(ρ≤j′) > acVali(ρ≤j).
We are going to construct a strategy σ′′i for player i which witnesses that acVali(ρ≤j) ≥
acVali(ρ≤j′) showing a contradiction.
We are going to define a strategy profile (σ′i, σ′−i) by distinguishing two cases.
1. If acVali(ρ≤j′) > aVali(ρ≤j′), then let (σ′i, σ′−i) be a strategy profile, and ε > 0 such
that
payoffi(Outρ≤j′ (σ
′
i, σ
′
−i)) ≥ acVali(ρ≤j′)− ε > max(aVali(ρ≤j′),acVali(ρ≤j)),
while satisfying aVali(ρ≤j′ , σ′i) = aVali(ρ≤j′). Such a strategy profile exists by the
definition of acVali.
2. If acVali(ρ≤j′) = aVali(ρ≤j′), then define σ′i as a worst-case optimal strategy from
history ρ≤j′ (by Assumption 1), and choose σ′−i arbitrarily.
Let σwcoi,h be a player i strategy satisfying aVali(h, σwcoi,h ) = aVali(h), which exists by
Assumption 1. Let σ′′i denote the strategy of player i which, from ρ≤j , follows the his-
tory ρjρj+1 . . . ρj′ and switches to σ′i, and at any other prefix h switches to σwcoi,h . Formally,
let us define
σ′′i (h) =

ρl if h = ρ≤l−1, l ≤ j′, ρl−1 ∈ Vi,
σ′i(h) if ρ≤j′ ⊆pref h, last(h) ∈ Vi
σwcoi,h1(h) if h = h1h2, |h2| ≥ 1, h1 = lcp(h,Outρ≤j′ (σ′i, σ′−i)).
We define similarly,
σ′′−i(h) =

ρl if h = ρl−1, l ≤ j′, ρl−1 ∈ V−i,
σ′−i(h) if ρ≤j′ ⊆pref h, last(h) ∈ V−i,
σ0−i(h) otherwise,
where σ0−i is an arbitrary strategy profile for −i.
Now, by construction, Outρ≤j (σ′′i , σ′′−i) = Outρ≤j (σ′i, σ′−i) which has payoff at least
acVali(ρ≤j′)− ε > acVali(ρ≤j) in the first case, and equal to acVali(ρ≤j′) > acVali(ρ≤j)
in the second case. Moreover, against any other strategy τ of players −i, we have
payoffi(Outρ≤j (σ′′i , τ)) ≥ aVali(ρ≤j)
since player i switches to σwcoi,h at any minimal history h that is not a prefix of the out-
come of (σ′i, σ′−i); and for any such h, aVali(h) ≥ aVali(ρ≤j). In fact, we saw above
that aVali(h≤|h|−1) ≥ aVali(ρ≤j). Moreover, since h≤|h|−1 ends in a vertex in V−i, the
antagonistic value cannot decrease: so aVali(h) ≥ aVali(ρ≤j).
This is a contradiction since from history ρ≤j , σ′′i achieves a cooperative value greater
than acVali(ρ≤j), and a worst-case value of at least aVali(ρ≤j).
To conclude, we have shown that for all j ≤ j′ < k both aVali(ρ≤j) ≤ aVali(ρ≤j′) and
acVali(ρ≤j) ≥ acVali(ρ≤j′). Since, by definition aVal(ρ≤j′) ≤ acVali(ρ≤j′), for all j′ ≥ j,
and k was chosen arbitrarily, the result follows.
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(b) From aVali(ρ≤j , σi) = aVali(ρ≤j), and acVali(ρ≤j) = aVali(ρ≤j), it follows that
all outcomes of σi that extend ρ≤j must have payoff exactly aVali(ρ≤j). In particular,
payoffi(ρ) = aVali(ρ≤j).
Let us show that aVali(ρ≤k) = acVali(ρ≤k) = aVali(ρ≤j) for all k > j. Note that since
j ≤ k, aVal(ρ≤k, σi) ≥ aVal(ρ≤j , σi). Since aVali(ρ≤k, σi) ≤ aVali(ρ≤k), we have
aVali(ρ≤k) ≥ aVali(ρ≤k, σ) ≥ aVali(ρ≤j , σ) = aVali(ρ≤j).
Towards a contradiction, assume that this is not an equality. We cannot have aVali(ρ≤k) <
aVali(ρ≤j) since, this would contradict aVali(ρ≤j , σ) = aVali(ρ≤j). Also, if we assume
that aVali(ρ≤k) > aVali(ρ≤j), since ρ≤k is compatible with σi from history ρ≤j , it follows
that acVali(ρ≤j) ≥ aVali(ρ≤k), contradiction.
The result follows. J
We can now prove Thm. 13.
Proof of Thm. 13. ⇐ Suppose that ρ is compatible with an admissible strategy σi for
player i. We will show that for any prefix h of ρ, such that last(h) ∈ Vi, ρ, |h| satisfies either
ϕ1 or ϕ2.
First, observe that (ρ, |h|) |= aValiq for exactly one q ∈ aValuesi. Now, since σi is
admissible, we have, from Thm. 11, that at h either (1) or (2) holds.
If (1) holds, then cVali(h, σ) > aVali(h), so there is σ−i ∈ Σ−i compatible with h such
that payoffi(ρ′) > aVali(h) = q where ρ′ = Outh(G, σi, σ−i). If ρ = ρ′ then (ρ, |h|) |= ϕ1.
Otherwise, let j be the first index where ρj 6= ρ′j . We have ρj−1 ∈ V−i and j > |h| because
σi and σ−i are compatible with h. Moreover cVali(ρj−1) ≥ payoffi(ρ′) > q, so gAltiq is
satisfied by ρ, j. Therefore the sub-formula F(gAltiq), and thus ϕ1, are satisfied by ρ, |h|.
Otherwise (2) holds, which means that aVali(h, σ) = cVali(h, σ) = acVali(h) =
aVali(h) = q. By Lem. 21 (b), we have that payoffi(ρ) = q and aVali is constantly
equal to q along ρ after h; so ϕ2 is satisfied by ρ, |h|.
⇒ Let ρ be an outcome which satisfies Φiadm. We define strategy σi for player i which
follows ρ, and on any history that is not a prefix of ρ, switches immediately either to a
strongly cooperative-optimal or to a worst-case optimal strategy, depending on whether
ϕ1 or ϕ2 holds. Formally, for each history h, let us fix a strongly cooperative-optimal
strategy σscoh for player i in the game Gh, a worst-case optimal strategy σwcoh from h in G,
that is, aVali(h, σwcoh ) = aVali(h). Remark the former is guaranteed to exist because of
Lem. 8. Given h such that last(h) ∈ Vi, we let σi(h) be
ρk+1 if h = ρ≤k
σscoh0 (h
′) if h0 |= ϕ1, h0 is the smallest prefix of h with last(h) ∈ Vi ∧ h0 6⊆pref ρ,
and h′ = h≥|h0|.
σwcoh0 (h) if h0 |= ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, h0 is the smallest prefix of h with last(h) ∈ Vi ∧ h0 6⊆pref ρ.
It is clear that ρ is compatible with σi. We now show that σi is admissible.
Let us start with histories h that are not a prefix of ρ, say, of the form h = h0ah′
where h0 is the smallest prefix of h ending in Vi which is not a prefix of ρ. We show that
either (1) or (2) hold for h and σi by distinguishing two cases.
1. Assume σi follows σscoh0 at h0, which is strongly cooperative-optimal, thus admissible in
the game Gh0 by Lem. 6. This strategy thus satisfies (1) at h′, that is,
aVali(Gh0 , h′) < cVali(Gh0 , h′, σscoh0 ), (6)
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or it satisfies (2), which is
aVali(Gh0 , h′) = acVali(Gh0 , h′) = aVali(Gh0 , h′, σscoh0 ). (7)
We are going to show that (1) or (2) hold for G at history h.
Assume (6) holds at h′ in Gh0 . By Lem. 2, we have that the LHS of (6) is equal to
aVali(G, h0ah′) = aVali(G, h). But, by the definition of σi, the RHS of (6) is equal to
cVali(G, h0ah′, σi) since σi(h0ag) = σwcoh0 (g) for all g ∈ Histlast(h0)(G).
Assume (7) holds at h′ in Gh0 . By Lem. 2, we have that aVali(Gh0 , h′) = aVali(G, h)
and acVali(Gh0 , h′) = acVali(G, h). Moreover, aVali(Gh0 , h′, σscoh0 ) = aVali(G, h, σi)
since σi(h0ag) = σscoh0 (g) for all g ∈ Histlast(h0)(G).
Thus (1) or (2) hold in G for σ and h.
2. Or σ follows σwcoh0 which means, for k = |h0|, (ρ, k) |= ϕ2, and so for some q ∈ aValuesi we
have that (ρ, k) |= aValiq∧acValiq. Therefore aVali(ρ≤k) = acVali(ρ≤k). By construction
of σi we have that aVali(ρ≤k, σi) = aVali(ρ≤k, σwcoρ≤k) = aVali(ρ≤k). It is clear from
the definition of cVali that aVali(ρ≤k, σi) ≤ cVali(ρ≤k, σi). We claim that, in fact, we
have equality in this case. Towards, a contradiction, assume that this is not the case.
Thus, it holds that aVali(ρ≤k, σi) < cVali(ρ≤k, σi). Since we have already established
that aVali(ρ≤k, σi) = aVali(ρ≤k), this implies (by def. of acVali) that acVali(ρ≤k) >
aVali(ρ≤k). Contradiction. Hence (2) holds.
For any history ρ≤k with ρk ∈ Vi, we consider two cases.
If (ρ, k) |= ϕ1 then either payoffi(ρ) > aVali(ρ≤k), and (1) holds, or (ρ, k′) |= gAltiq
for some position k′ > k and for q = aVali(ρ≥k). In the latter case, ρk′ ∈ V−i and
cVali(ρk′) > aVali(ρk), so for any history ρ≤k · v with v 6= ρk′+1, by construction, σi
switches to a strongly cooperative-optimal strategy; thus cVali(ρ≤k′ · v, σi) > aVali(h).
It then follows that cVali(h, σi) ≥ cVali(ρ≤k′ · v, σi) > aVali(h), which satisfies (1).
Otherwise (ρ, k) |= ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ1. In particular, since ϕ2 is satisfied, there is some q such
that payoffi(ρ) = q = aVali(ρ≤k) = acVali(ρ≤k) and ρ≥k |= G(aValiq). Hence the antag-
onistic values of all histories h′ extending ρ≥k are all equal to aVali(ρ≤k). Since σi imme-
diately switches to a worst-case optimal strategy when we do not follow ρ, all outcomes
of σi extending ρ≤k have payoff at least aVali(ρ≤k), so aVali(σi, ρ≤k) = aVali(ρ≤k).
Moreover outcomes of σi from ρ≤k has coinciding cooperative and antagonistic values.
That is, we necessarily have that cVali(ρ≤k, σi) = aVali(ρ≤k, σi). Indeed, if this were
not the case, then the cooperative value would be strictly higher and this would contra-
dict the fact that aVali(ρ≤k) = acVali(ρ≤k)—this is by definition of acVali. This shows
aVali(ρ≤k, σi) = cVali(ρ≤k, σi) = aVali(ρ≤k) = acVali(ρ≤k), hence (2) holds. J
13 Making infimum and supremum functions prefix-independent
The payoff functions defined using Inf and Sup are not prefix-independent. Nevertheless,
our results are also applicable to those measures after applying a simple and classical trans-
formation to the game structure. This transformation ensures prefix-independence for those
measures for all plays in the new game and a bijection between the strategies in the original
game and the strategies in the modified game. For Inf (rest. Sup), the transformation is as
follows: for each player i ∈ P , we record, as additional information in the vertices of the
game, the minimal (resp. maximal) value seen so far with the weight function wi. We then
modify the weight function to output the recorded value if the original label of the edge
that is taken is larger (resp. smaller) than or equal to the recorded value, and to output the
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original value otherwise. In the latter case, the new minimum (resp. maximum) is recorded.
Clearly, the measure Inf (resp. Sup) is prefix-independent on all the plays of the new game
structure.
14 Computing the antagonistic-cooperative value
Under Assumptions 1-3, and assuming values aVali and cVali can be computed at each
vertex, we show how acVali can be computed as well. Given game G, history h, and
player i, let G≥aVali(h) denote the game obtained by restricting G to vertices v such that
aVali(v) ≥ aVali(h). One can check that all vertices in G≥aVali(h) have at least one outgoing
edge and that acVali(h) = cVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)). This is formalized and proven below.
I Lemma 22. For all games defined using payoff functions considered here, a) any vertex
in G≥aVali(h) reachable from last(h) has at least one outgoing edge; b) for any player i and
history h, cVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)) = acVali(G, h).
Proof.
Proof of first item. Let v be a vertex in G≥aVali(h) reachable from last(h). Because of
Assumption 1, we have that in G there is a strategy σi ∈ Σi which achieves a payoff of at
least aVali(v). By construction of G≥aVali(h), we also have that aVali(v) ≥ aVali(h). Now,
if v ∈ Vi, the edge (v, σi(v)) is also present in G≥aVali(h). Otherwise, σi(v) from G is such
that aVali(σi(v)) < aVali(h) and this contradicts our choice of σi. If v 6∈ Vi, then, by the
same argument, all outgoing edges from v in G should be present in G≥aVali(h).
Proof of second item. We observe that for all strategies σi ∈ Σi, if ρ is an outcome com-
patible with σi from last(h) and ρ visits a vertex v not in G≥aVali(h), then aVali(G, h, σi) <
aVali(G, h). Indeed, since v is not in G≥aVali(h), we have that aVali(G, v) < aVali(G, h).
The claim then follows from Assumption 3 and the definition of aVali. Thus the outcomes
affecting the value acVali are only those which stay in G≥aVali(h). That is, we have that
acVali(G, h) = acVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)).
By definition of cVali we then get that
cVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)) ≥ acVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)) = acVali(G, h). (8)
Consider now an outcome ρ in G≥aVali(h) from last(h) witnessing the cooperative value,
that is payoffi(ρ) = cVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)). Recall the existence of ρ is implied by
Property 2. Consider a strategy σi for player i which follows ρ until the players −i
stops following it (that is, until the current history is no longer a prefix of ρ). At this
point, σi switches to a strategy which ensures at least aVali(G, h). It is easy to see
that σi is such that cVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h), σi) = cVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)) and, further,
aVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h), σi) = aVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)). The latter implies that
cVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)) ≤ acVali(G≥aVali(h), last(h)) = acVali(G, h) (9)
which concludes the proof. J
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15 Proof of Thm. 18
Proof. For each player i ∈ P , consider the formula Φiadm from Thm. 13, which describes
the set Out(G,Ai(G)). To compute Φiadm, we just need to compute aVali(v), cVali(v) and
acVali(v) for each vertex v and player i ∈ P . This is possible due to Lem. 16.
It is easy to see that the problem now amounts to verifying if G satisfies the specification(∧
i∈P Φiadm
)
=⇒ ϕ.
For payoff functions Inf, Sup, LimSup, and LimInf, all propositions of the form payoffi ./ v
are regular; in particular, each of them can be replaced by an LTL formula. The problem
of model checking under admissibility is then reduced to model checking the obtained LTL
formula.
For payoff functions MP and MP, we use the results of [3] which show that the model
checking problem against a formula in LTLpayoff is decidable. J
